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Abstract

Weaponizing Anti-dumping

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International trade policy appears to be entering a new phase. The existing rules of trade did not allow the imposition of trade policy instruments for non-trade reasons. Countries are now increasingly weaponizing trade policy to achieve non-trade objectives (i.e. incentivizing countries to control outward migration, to reduce the cross-border drug outflows, increase defense spending, reduce trade surpluses). Anti-dumping is one trade policy which can be used to achieve such non-trade ends. One example is the threat to open an anti-dumping investigation against Canadian canola in retaliation for the imposition of one hundred percent tariffs on Chinese-made electronic vehicles. The suitability of anti-dumping actions for use in achieving non-trade ends is explored in this article.

Keywords: anti-dumping, duties, non-trade ends, rules of trade

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